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'PAWNS WILL LIVE WHEN SLAVES IS APT TO DYE': 
CREDIT, SLAVING AND PAWNSHIP AT OLD CALABAR IN THE ERA OF 
THE SLAVE TRADE' 
Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson 
Stimulated by Adam Smith's claim in 1776 that the ' greater part of the exportation and 
coasting trade of America is carried on by the capital of merchants who reside in Great 
Britain', I various scholars have been attracted to the study of the role of European 
capital in funding expansion in the Americas in the colonial period and beyond. One 
of the most important recent contributions to this scholarly discourse came in 1991 
when Jacob Price highlighted the critical role played by European credit in facilitating 
the development and expansion of slavery and slave-based agriculture in the Americas 
before 1800. Price's analysis largely centred on the British West Indian and mainland 
North American colonies and on credit arrangements in the slave trade. Since the 
purchase of slaves was a major cost in establishing plantations and payment for them 
depended on the anticipated stream of income from their labour, planters naturally 
looked for credit from suppliers of slaves when seeking to purchase them. In the late 
seventeenth century the Royal African Company supplied most of this credit and in the 
process encumbered itself with a large burden of colonial debts which proved difficult 
to recover. After the ending in 1698 of the company's monopoly of Britain's trade to 
Africa, the task of supplying credit to planters passed to the private merchants who 
succeeded it. In their efforts to control and manage credit before 1750, such merchants 
appear to have relied heavily on personal ties with the commission agents who handled 
slave sales in the colonies . But after 1750 commission agents typically became more 
closely tied with London commercial houses who guaranteed bills of exchange drawn 
by their agents in favour of the merchants whose ships carried slaves from Africa. As 
these bills often had 12 months or more to run before they matured and most payments 
I Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the WealJh of Nalions (London, 
Routledge edition, 1900), 282. 
for slaves were made in bills, London houses thus maintained a vital line of credit for 
slave purchases in the colonies that may have reached several million pounds a year in 
the late eighteenth century. As Price remarks, one may conceive of a slave trade 
' conducted entirely for cash, but it would undoubtedly have been a much smaller trade ' 
than it actually was .2 In short, the existence of cash substitutes must potentially have 
increased the volume of the slave trade. 
The number of slaves shipped from Africa to the Americas rose from around 30,000 
a year in the late seventeenth century to nearly 80,000 a year a century later. Recent 
studies suggest that the expansion of slave exports that occurred in this period depended 
on the extension inland of slave catchment areas in regions such as the Gold Coast, 
Slave Coast, Bight of Biafra, and Angola which were already substantial exporters of 
slaves by 1700 and the opening up of new sources of slaves, notably along the coast 
between the Gambia and the Gold Coast and further east at Cameroons, Gabon, and the 
northern Angolan (or Loango) coast.3 Thus, just as European demand for raw cotton 
in the nineteenth century helped to trigger westward expansion in the United States, so 
expanding frontiers of plantation agriculture in the Americas before 1800 stimulated the 
widening of slaving frontiers within Africa.4 
It has long been acknowledged that the opening up and commercial development of 
uncultivated land in the Americas depended on inflows of capital from other regions .5 
2Jacob M . Price, 'Credit in the Slave Trade and Plantation Economies ' , in Barbara L. 
Solow (ed.), Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System (Cambridge, 1991), 335-36. 
3David Richardson, ' Slave Exports from West and West-Central Africa, 1700-1810: 
New Estimates of Volume and Distribution' , Journal of African History, 30 (1989) 17. 
40 n the relationship between westward expansion and export demand for cotton, see 
D.C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States 1790-1860 (New York, 1966). 
5D .C. North, ' International Capital Hows and the Development of the American 
West' , Journal of Economic History, XVI1 (1956) , 493-505 . 
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But the way in which expanding frontiers of slaving activity in Africa were financed has 
attracted rather less attention from historians . This reflects, in part, a lack of 
information about the mechanics of slave supply in Africa. It probably also reflects, 
however, a belief that the costs of producing and moving slaves was low. The fact that 
slaves were self-propelled and could carry other goods on their march to the coast 
perhaps lends some weight to this belief. Nevertheless, when allowance is made for 
the death of slaves and other wastage, levies on trade, and other costs, moving slaves 
was far from inexpensive. Moreover, as Curtin has suggested, it probably also cost -a 
great deal to hold them for the market' .6 Calculations by Curtin suggest that -in an 
ordinary year' storage or holding costs alone could amount to -about half the purchase 
price' of slaves in Senegambia.7 Estimates of the cost of moving and holding slaves in 
other regions have yet to be made, but it is likely that as frontiers of slaving activity 
extended inland, reaching 150-200 miles or more in some places, such costs were 
increasingly burdensome for African merchants.s Significantly, perhaps, mark-ups on 
slave prices between far-interior and coastal markets were at least 200 per cent by the 
end of the eighteenth century. 9 
Some of the costs associated with generating slaves from previously unexploited sources 
were no doubt borne by participants in established commercial networks in West and 
West-Central Africa. In West Africa in particular, these often included Muslim 
networks, which were also involved in fmancing internal trades in kola, salt, textiles, 
6p.D . Curtin, Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the 
Slave Trade (Madison, 1975), 169. 
8J .C. Miller, Way of Death (Madison, 1988), 189-95. 
9p .D. Curtin, Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Supplementary Evidence 
(Madison, 1975), 49; Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, -Competing Markets for 
Male and Female Slaves: Prices in the Interior of West Africa, 1780-1850', 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 28 (1995), 281. 
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leather and other goods. to For the trans-Atlantic slave trade, however, credit supplied 
by European traders underpinned the development and expansion of the slave catchment 
areas along the Atlantic coast. Thus Miller has argued that ' the European ability to 
advance goods' was at ' the core of the complex forces that fuelled the transport and 
distribution sectors of western central Africa's eighteenth century political economy' , 
with credit inflows underwriting' the rise of new African trading regimes' . 11 Similarly, 
the chartered companies that dominated European trade with Africa before 1700 are 
said to have been ' an important source of credit to political officers, brokers , 
merchants, and others' at the Gold Coast. In the Bight of Biafra, trade was sustained 
by goods ' given on credit' to coastal merchants and their inland partners by European 
traders.12 According to Latham, after 1750, the Eflk traders of Old Calabar received 
'large sums' of credit from Europeans, the latter ' expecting slaves in return':3 
Overall, there appears to be a consensus that to satisfy external demand for slaves 
African merchants relied heavily on credit or working capital supplied by Europeans . 
Despite these observations, we still know very little about the amount, length, and cost 
of credit advanced by Europeans to African slave suppliers. As Price suggests, in 
comparison with the Americas, the amount of credit advanced in Africa was probably 
modest. 14 According to Kea, ' debts standing out' at Cape Coast Castle in 1701 totalled 
IOpaul E. Lovejoy, Caravans of Kola: the Hausa Kola Trade 1700-1900 (Zaria, 1980). 
IIMiller, Way of Death , 187. 
12Ray A Kea, Settlements, Trade and Politics in the Seventeenth-Century Gold Coast 
(Baltimore), (1982), 239; K.O. Dike and Feiicia Ekejiuba, The Aro of South-Eastern 
Nigeria, 1650-1980 (lbadan, 1990), 243. 
13 A.1.H. Latham, Old Calabar 1600-1891: the 1mpactof the International Economy 
upon a Traditional Society (Oxford, 1973), 28. 
14Price, ' Credit', 300. 
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some 565,500 dambas in gold, or less than £7,000 sterling.l~ Even in relatively good 
years, the Royal African Company appears to have had only small debts owing at James 
Fort as well. According to Curtin, the Company was never owed more than £3,500 at 
any time in 1735-41, a trivial swn compared to the debts accwnulated by the Company 
in the Americas before 1700.16 However, it should be noted that by the 1730s Gambia 
supplied relatively few slaves to the Atlantic trade; all but a few of the slaves exported 
from the region were shipped by private traders. 
Whatever the absolute amounts of credit advanced by Europeans in Africa and even 
though less than in the Americas, credit was just as important in facilitating the seizure 
and movement to market of slaves in Africa as it was in fostering the clearance and 
cultivation of land in the Americas. Lower absolute amounts probably simply reflect 
the fact that it took less time and fewer resources to produce in Africa the slaves 
necessary to clear debts than it took to produce the crops in America to do the same. 
Hence, to extend Price's argument to the African coast, the level of slave shipments 
from Africa would almost certainly have been much lower than it was without the 
provision of credit by Europeans to African dealers. 
As a contribution to the study of credit arrangements along the Atlantic seaboard of pre-
colonial Africa, we shall focus on the slave trade of Old Calabar in the Bight of Biafra. 
In the two centuries after 1660, The Bight ofBiafra was the third most important source 
of slaves in Africa after the Slave Coast and Angola. It appears that some 1.65 million 
slaves were shipped from the region in 1662-1867, with the peak of shipments 
occurring in the late eighteenth century when 15-20,000 slaves a year are estimated to 
I~Kea , Settlemenls, 240. 
16Curtin, Senegambia, 303-4. 
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have embarked for the Americas.17 The vast majority of those shipped before 1807 
were carried on British ships, with merchants at Bristol and Liverpool being 
particularly attracted to the region. 18 Appropriately, much of our evidence on credit 
arrangements in the slave trade of Old Calabar comes from British sources and refers 
to the period from 1760 to 1807, when slave shipments from the port were at their 
height. 
The remainder of this article falls into four sections. In section I we attempt to establish 
the amount and duration of credit obtained by African slave dealers, paying particular 
attention to the late eighteenth century. In section n we outline some recent theoretical 
approaches to the study of exchange activities and to the institutional and social 
arrangements that accompany them. In Section m we explore the social relations 
between slave sellers and buyers at Old Calabar in the late eighteenth century, while 
in section IV we discuss the institutional arrangements that developed in the region to 
limit the exposure of credit suppliers to risks of default on payment of debts by African 
slave dealers. Section V presents some conclusions on the nature of credit in cross-
cultural trade at the interface of distinct commercial networks. 
The precise amount of credit advanced by Europeans to African slave dealers at Old 
Calabar will never be known. Latham suggests that little credit was likely offered by 
Europeans in the ' uncertain conditions' that prevailed at Old Calabar before 1700, but 
that credit became more available as ' trading relations ' between Africans and 
17David Eltis, ' The Volume and African Origins of the British Slave Trade before 
1714', Cahiers d'Etudes Ajricaines, XXXV, nos .2-3 (1995), 620 (for figures before 
1700): Richardson, 'Slave Exports', 17 (for 1700-1809); David Eltis, Economic 
Growth and the Ending o/the Transatlantic Slave Trade (Oxford, 1987), 250-52. 
18Based on Transatlantic Slave Trade Database, Du Bois Institute for Afro-American 
Research, Harvard. 
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Europeans became more sophisticated in the eighteenth century. 19 John Adams, who 
traded at Old Calabar in the 179Os, claimed that many of the local traders at the port 
' expect and receive credit to a great extent' from EurOpeans.20 Moreover, he suggested 
that a similar situation existed at Bonny, where the local traders 'augment the quantity 
of their merchandise, by obtaining from their friends, the captains of the slave ships, 
a considerable quantity of goods on credit' .21 On Adams' reckoning, therefore, credit 
advances were extensive at the two major slaving ports in the Bight of Biafra by the 
1790s. 
There are indications that credit was being advanced by Europeans at Bonny over a 
century before Adams visited the coast. Jean Barbot, who travelled to Africa in 1678-
82, claimed that at Bonny Europeans 'were often obliged to trust' African slave brokers 
with goods in order to allow them 'to attend the upper markets, and purchase slaves 
for them'.22 Barbot's remarks, published in 1732, were reinforced by a description of 
a voyage by his brother, Jacques, in 1699 to the same port. According to this account, 
goods to the value of 150 bars of iron were advanced to the king 'by way of loan', with 
similar advances being made 'to his principal men, and others, . . . each in proportion 
of his quality and ability' .23 Evidence that British traders continued to supply credit at 
Andony and Bonny thirty years later is also to be found .24 
19Latham, Old Calabar, 27. 
20John Adams, Remarks on the Country Extending from Cape Palmas to the River 
Congo (london, 1823),248. 
2lIbid, 130. 
22P.E.H. Hair and Robin Law (eds.), Barbot on Guinea; the Writings of Jean Barbot 
on West Africa 1678-1712, 2 vols. (Hakluyt Society, London, 1992),11, 675. 
23Ibid, 11, 689. 
24National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London, AMS/4, Ship Castle Day Book 
1727. We are grateful to the Museum for pennission to use its records. 
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While the antiquity of credit advances at Old Calabar is unknown, by the 1760s, credit 
was expected and received by CaIabar merchants. The trade book of the Liverpool ship 
Dobson which visited Old Calabar in 1769-70 reveals that at least 67 of its 566 slaves 
were bought on ' trust' . 25 On 21 April 1785, Antera Duke, a leading trader of Duke 
Town, Old Calabar, noted in his diary that he and two others had asked one captain to 
' trust [goods] for slaves'.26 On this occasion, the request was refused, but the 
indications are that, in taking this position, the captain concerned was exceptional, since 
competition among traders probably forced most to accede to local dealers ' demands 
for credit. Similarly in June 1785, Antera Duke and two other traders of Duke Town 
received ' goods for 50 slaves' from one captain.27 As slaves were selling for about £15 
per head in the mid-1780s, the goods advanced in June 1785 to the three dealers were 
probably worth about £750.211 This sum was still modest, however, in comparison with 
the credit advanced by some other masters . Thus in December 1787 Richard Rogers, 
master of the Pearl, advised his owners, James Rogers & Co. of Bristol, that he had 
, deposited Goods in safe hands for 100 Slaves' , while, on 6 May 1792, the master of 
the African Queen, also owned by Rogers & Co. reported that he had 45 slaves on 
board and 'Goods in the Country' for a further 13l. Additional reports relating to the 
African Queen suggest that on 11 June the ship had 149 slaves ' on trust & paid for' and 
that this had increased to 160 by 9 July 1792.29 Whether the slaves referred to in June 
2.lDalemain House, Cumbria, Hassell Mss., Trade book of Dobson. We are grateful 
to Mr Robert Hassell-McCosh for permission to use material from his family 's papers. 
26' The Diary of Antera Duke', in Daryll Forde (ed.), Efik Traders of Old Calabar 
(London, 1956), 30. 
27' Diary' , 33. 
2IIDavid Richardson, ' Prices of Slaves in West and West-Central Africa: Toward an 
Annual Series, 1698-1807', Bulletin of Economic Research, 43 (1991) , 55. 
29p.R.0. C 107/12 (Pearl) ; C 107Il3 (African Queen) . 
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and July included those mentioned in May 1792 is unclear. But, assuming that they did 
not and that slaves cost about £15 each, it is likely that about £1500 of goods was 
advanced by Richard Rogers to African merchants in 1787 and that those commanding 
the African Queen had trusted out goods worth up to £4,365 in May-June 1792. We 
do not know if the amount of credit advanced on these voyages was typical . But on the 
basis of the reports, it would appear that, notwithstanding the reluctance of some 
shipmasters to advance credit, John Adams was correct to suggest that African dealers 
in slaves at Old Calabar received substantial credit from European traders by 1790. 
Indeed, with some ten to fifteen British ships on average arriving each year in the Cross 
River around 1790, new credit advances by British traders to Old Calabar merchants 
perhaps amounted to £40-50,000 or more a year when Adams visited the river. 30 
On certain parts of the African coast British traders were prepared to extend credit of 
six months or more to African dealers in slaves.31 Similar arrangements for credit of 
six months to two years were not uncommon at the British and American ends of the 
slave trade in the late eighteenth century. 32 But traders in ·the Bight of Biafra apparently 
anticipated that debts would be settled rather faster. Describing voyages he had made 
to Old Calabar and the River Del Rey in 1772-76, John Asbley Hall told Parliament in 
1790 that ' the Black traders' normally left ' with the goods they got from the ship ' , 
returning 'ten days to about three weeks later '. 33 William Prosser, who traded for 
~or clearances of ships from Britain to Calabar, see S.D. Behrendt, The British Slave 
Trade, 1785-1807: Volume, Profitability, and Mortality (ph.D. thesis , unpublished, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1993), 303. 
3IP.R.O. C 107/14, 24 April 1791 , Isle Delos, William Roper to James Rogers . 
32David Richardson, Bristol Africa and the Eighteenth-Century Slave Trade to America: 
Vol 4. The Final Years, 1770-1807, Bristol Record Society Publications, XL VII 
(1996), xxviii. 
33Sheila Lambert (ed.), House of Commons Sessional Papers in the Eighteenth Century, 
145 vols ., (Wilmington, NC, 1975-78), vo!. 72 (1790) , 226. 
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redwood at Gabon in 1792, observed that it was 'the custom in this River to trust out 
your Goods for Red Wood'.34 He had extended credit for six weeks to two months and, 
having advanced goods in April, he was 'in hopes of getting the Ship full in all June' .35 
The 5,000 billets that he had 'trusted out', at about 15s. per 100 billets ' Invoice price', 
amounted to less than £40 sterling. The evidence suggests that Prosser's expectations 
were largely fulfilled. An undated manifest, probably taken on 11 July 1792, shows 
that at that time he had nearly 24,000 billets of redwood and some other goods on board 
ship; soon after, he left the coast, returning to Bristol in mid-September 1792.36 
In the nineteenth century, according to Dike, good~ 'were trusted to the Delta 
middlemen by the British merchants for periods of from six months to a year or, in 
some rare cases, to two years'. Although these observations applied to the palm oil 
trade, similar arrangements were said to be 'prevalent during the slave trade', having 
been carried over 'from the old trade to the new' .37 Thus, on 7 July 1825, Duke 
Epbraim of Old Calabar promised Louis Loiseau, master of a French ship, that he 
would dispatch him 'with his full cargo, at five hundred Slaves in the Current of three 
Months from Datte'.38 But Loiseau seems to have been kept waiting nearly six months 
before he secured delivery of slaves from Duke Epbraim. Moreover, he was not alone 
34Public Record Office (hereafter P.R.O.) , Chancery Master' Exhibits, C 107/6, 10 
April 1792, William Prosser to James Rogers . 
35P.R.0. C 107/6. 
36Richardson, Final Years, 201. 
37K.0. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830-1885 (Oxford, 1956), 102. 
On the 'trust' system, see also G.!. Jones, The Trading States of the Oil Rivers: a Study 
of Political Development in Eastern Nigeria (London 1963); David Northup, Trade 
without Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic Development in South-Eastern Nigeria (Oxford, 
1978). 
38Serge Daget, Repenoire des Expeditions Negrieres Francaises a la Traite lllegale 
(1814-1850) (Nantes, 1988),380. ' 
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in failing to achieve early settlement of debts. After spending just over six months at 
Old Calabar, Hammett Forsyth, master of the African Queen, complained that he was 
still waiting for delivery of slaves on 24 September 1792, and debt arose from a 
' former Trust' that he was rmding it ' very difficult to recover, although in good 
hands' .39 The records do not reveal whether Forsyth' was ultimately successful in 
recovering these debts, but they do indicate that some ships were forced to leave the 
coast without securing full settlement of accounts by African merchants, leaving debts 
to be carried over into subsequent years or otherwise arranging means of transferring 
outstanding debts to other merchants.40 
Assessing the actual length of credit advanced by British traders at Old Calabar is, 
therefore, problematical, but the time taken by ships to secure a load of slaves provides 
some indication of average length of time in credit arrangements . The mean time taken 
by Bristol and Liverpool ships to load slaves in the Bight of Biafra was three to four 
months between 1750 and 1800. On the whole, ships spent a similar amount of time 
at the Slave Coast, significantly less than at Upper Guinea, the Gold Coast, and 
Angola.41 Loading times varied substantially, however, with some ships at Old Calabar 
taking less than a month to obtain their slaves while others took up to a year or more. 
Thus , while traders who had advanced goods on credit to merchants at Old Calabar 
might reasonably anticipate the clearance of debts within, say, six months , there was, 
nevertheless, a strong possibility that they might have to wait considerably longer 
before accounts were settled. In this respect, Dike's suggestion that credit in Delta 
ports was normally extended by British traders for six to twelve months appears to be 
just as applicable to the late eighteenth century as to ftfty years later. 
39p .R.0 . C 107/13. 
4OP .R.O. C 107/13, papers of the Triton 1791. 
41David Eltis and David Richardson, ' Productivity in the Transatlantic Slave Trade' , 
Explorations in Economic History, 32 (1995) , 478. 
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IT 
The provision of credit at Old Calabar clearly entailed risks and, as such, constituted 
an important element of the transaction costs surrounding slaving activity in the region. 
Neo-classical economics has tended to dismiss such transactions costs as marginal to 
economic activity, preferring instead to concentrate on production costs. Where 
problems over exchange have been identified, neo-classical theory assumes that low-
cost, state-sponsored, legal systems can provide a means of resolution. As Williamson 
has reminded us, however, in the sphere of exchange, economies did not operate in a 
frictionless world.42 It is now acknowledged that human behaviour and market 
structures that underlie neo-classical theory do not mesh perfectly. Most of the 
resulting theoretical work has centred on the institutions of modem industrial 
capitalism, as economists have grappled with the implications of monopolistic 
competition, bounded rationality, and opportunism for negotiating and implementing 
contracts between sellers and buyers of goods and services. This focus, in turn, has 
resulted in a reappraisal of the role of the state and legal systems in enforcing contracts 
and a growing emphasis on private arrangements between individual players or fInns 
in the market. As a result, 'private ordering' has increasingly been seen as providing 
more effective mechanisms for ensuring the fulfilment of contractual obligations in 
many circumstances than the ' legal centralism' of earlier approaches .43 Particularly 
significant in this context is the stress on the role of hostages in maintaining 'credible 
commitments' by parties involved in market exchanges.44 
420liver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Finns, Markets, 
Relational Contracting (New York, 1985), 19. 
43Janet T. Landa, Trust, Ethnicity and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional 
Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law and Gift-Exchange (Ann Arbor, 
1994). 
440liver E. Williamson, ' Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support 
Exchange', American Economic Review, 73 (1983) , 519-40. 
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Transactions cost economics is centrally concerned with economic organizations and 
the way in which institutions adapt and change in order to economize on the costs of 
running the economic system.45 Proponents of this approach have been accused of a 
simplistic functionalism; social institutions and arrangements which were 'previously 
thought to be the adventitious result of legal, historical, social, or political forces' are 
largely to be viewed as 'the efficient solution to certain economic problems', with 
malfeasance being averted ' because clever institutional arrangements make it too costly 
to engage in'. Rather than produce trust, such arrangements are seen as 'a functional 
substitute for it' .46 Because some degree of trust is required in order for exchange to 
operate smoothly, economic activity is perceived to be embedded in systems of 
sustained personal relations and social networks . In particular, 'the identity and past 
relations of individual transactors' are seen as providing fIrmer foundations for 
generating trust than institutional arrangements or other methods, including generalized 
morality .47 This theory is reminiscent of the Prisoners' Dilemma, in which co-
operation rather than individualism pays , especially where transactors are in a 
continuing rather than ' one-off relationship. 48 
Some exponents of the 'new institutional economics' now agree that the 'social context 
in which transactions are embedded - the customs, mores, habits, and so on - have a 
bearing, and therefore need to be taken into account, when moving from one culture 
45Williamson, Economic Institutions, 8. 
46Mark Granovetter, ' Economic Action and Social Structure: the Problem of 
Embeddedness', American Journal of Sociology, 91 (1985), 488-89. 
47Ibid. 491. 
48Andrew Schotter, Free Market Economics: a Critical Appraisal (New York, 1985), 
47-51. 
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to another' .49 In studying cross-cultural trade, including trade between Europeans and 
Africans, Curtin has claimed that both market and other forms of exchange 'have a role 
to play' in such trade, the precise balance between the two depending on the specific 
situation.$O More recently, Guyer has argued that, at the African coast, there existed 
an ' economic interface' between African systems of production and exchange linked 
to social identity and status and based on use-values ra~er than the market-orientated 
systems associated with Europeans.~1 According to Guyer, the lack of convertibility 
of African commodity-based currencies reinforced social and institutional barriers to 
market exchange and severely inhibited the integration of West African economies into 
the Atlantic capitalist system .~2 
Despite the last claims, slave exports from western Africa to America, as we have seen, 
rose substantially in the eighteenth century. Moreover, if Old Calabar is a guide, credit 
advances to African slave dealers probably rose in harmony with exports of people. 
We would suggest that, in the case of Old Calabar, the trust between shipmasters and 
slave dealers that underpinned credit was founded on a mixture of social connections 
and institutional arrangements. Thus masters are reputed to have joined local secret 
associations such as Ekpe which had debt-collecting powers, while at the same time 
they required African merchants to lodge hostages or ' pawns' with them in exchange 
49Williamson, Economic Institutions, 22 . 
~.D . Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History (Cambridge, 1984), 14. 
~I Miller, Way of Death, 175; Sara S Berry, ' Stable Prices, Unstable Values: Some 
Thought on Monetization and the Meaning of Transactions in West African 
Economies' , in Jane Guyer (ed.), Money Matters: Instability, Values and Social 
Payments in the Modem History of West African Communities (portsmouth, NH, 1994), 
304. 
~2Jane Guyer, 'Introduction: the Currency Interface and its Dynamics' , in Guyer (ed.), 
Money Matters , 8. 
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for goods advanced on credit. 53 Pawnship - or the pledging of goods or people as 
security against loans - was widespread in West and West-Central Africa in the 
eighteenth century; commercial pawning was a variant of this indigenous practice that 
appears to have existed elsewhere in western Africa as well.SI As an institution, 
pawnsbip depended upon social relations between debtors and creditors, but the exact 
nature of the institutional practices that underlay trust between the parties involved in 
slave transactions at Old Calabar and other regions remains, as yet, unclear. 
By combining existing records with previously unused sources, it is possible to shed 
new light on the mechanisms by which trust was created between lenders and borrowers 
at Old Calabar before 1800. At this stage of research, any conclusions must be 
regarded as tentative. Moreover, caution needs to be exercised in applying findings 
relating to Old Calabar to credit arrangements in other regions. But the weight of 
historical evidence seems to indicate that, while social relations between slave suppliers 
and shippers were not unimportant, hostage taking or commercial pawning was a vital 
factor in maintaining trust and credit at Old Calabar at the height of slave trafficking. 
In this respect, our fmdings demonstrate how theories of transactions costs economics 
can inform and qualify theories of trust based on the concept of social embeddedness 
that ignore pawnsbip, slavery and other institutions of servility . We begin by exploring 
the social relations surrounding the slave trade at Old Calabar and then turn to 
commercial pawning activities. 
III 
Slave shipments from Old Calabar were channelled through several towns or wards in 
53Latham, Old Caiabar, 27, 38. 
SlMiller, Way of Death, 179. 
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the Cross River. ss These were controlled by Efik traders, a group of Ibibio-speakers 
who had originally settled at Creek Town some time before 1650 but who sub-divided 
into seven wards or houses, each with its own settlements, during the following 
century. It is likely that the early slave trade of Old Calabar was dominated by 
merchants based at Old Town (or Obutong) but by the late 1760s their hold over the 
trade had been eclipsed by merchants of other wards, notably those of Duke Town and 
Henshaw Town. 
Within the various wards or towns, trade seems to have been controlled by small 
groups of traders or commercial houses. Continuous records of these houses are 
unavailable, but the accounts and correspondence of the Old Calabar trade around 1770 
and the diary of Antera Duke for 1785-8 reveal that up to thirty merchants may have 
been involved in the slave trade of the Cross River in the last decades of the eighteenth 
century.56 Prominent among these were Eyo Nsa (or Willy Honesty) of Creek Town, 
Tommy Henshaw of Henshaw Town, and Egbo Young, Antera Duke, and Edem Ekpo 
and his son, Efiam Edem (both known as Duke Ephraim) of Duke Town. Of the thirty 
traders noted by Antera Duke in his diary, as many as a half were involved in supplying 
slaves to British ships nearly two decades earlier.s7 Moreover, several of those active 
in 1785-8 remained involved in slaving beyond 1800 while others were clearly 
succeeded as merchants by their descendants . 58 The continuity among African 
merchant families in the slave trade between 1750 and the early nineteenth century 
5sne following descriptions of commercial structures at Old Calabar draws on Latham, 
Old Calabar and Northrup, Trade without Rulers. 
56P.E.H. Hair, ' Antera Duke of Old Calabar - A Little More about an African 
Entrepreneur' , History in Africa, 17 (1990) , 360. 
5'For the names of traders supplying slaves in 1769-70, see Account Book of Dobson, 
1769-90, in Hassell papers, Dalemain, Cumbria. 
58Latham, Old Calabar. 
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appears to have been considerable. In turn these Calabar commercial houses levied 
duties or 'coomey' on ships arriving in the river which in effect assured indirect access 
through trade with the river port of ltu, where Aro traders from the interior brought 
their slave supplies.'9 
The institutional mechanism to contain the rivalry that existed among the various wards 
of the Cross River was vested in the Ekpe secret society, which was a graded 
association of adult males that interlocked with similar associations at all the 
commercial centres of the Biafran interior. Probably founded in the mid-eighteenth 
century,60 Ekpe has sometimes been referred to as a 'secret society' because its 
decisions and their implementation were governed by collective responsibility and taken 
in closed session. On the whole, the wealthiest and most powerful merchants 
dominated the highest grades of Ekpe and competed for its principal offices. These 
men were responsible, among other things, for debt enforcement, having the power to 
' blow' ekpe, that is punish offenders through swnmary justice. Membership in Ekpe 
extended to Aro traders, who fonned similar closed associations of their own in the 
interior. Moreover, the Aro controlled the lbinukpabi oracle at Arochukwu, their 
capital; the oracle was recognized as the supreme court of appeal for a range of legal 
issues that pertained to credit and trade, including the protection of merchants and 
markets, the settlement of sectarian disputes, and the accumulation of slaves through 
frnes and fees levied on litigants . Hence the leading ward houses at Old Calabar 
participated in a network of overlapping agencies that served to enforce payment of 
debts and to protect the commercial interests of the export trade in slaves .6 1 
S9Por the Aro, see Northrup, Trade without Rulers; Dik!! and Ekejiuba, Aro of South-
Eastern Nigeria. 
6OLatham, Old Calabar, 36 . 
6100 the lbinukpabi oracle, see Dike and Ekejiuba, Aro of South-Eastern Nigeria , 249. 
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Just as a few trading houses controlled slave exports from Old Calabar between 1750 
and 1807, so a relatively small number of Bristol and L~verpool merchants dominated 
European trade with the region.62 In this respect, at least, slaving transactions at Old 
Calabar resembled the situation described by Granovetter, where agents had recurrent 
dealings with each other and relied on their past record of dealings to determine 
whether 'a particular other may be expected to deal honestly' . 63 British traders 
certainly recognized the value of social relations and honest dealings in building trust 
and maintaining trade. In 1761, William Earle of Liverpool promised Duke Abashy 
of Old Town that two of his sons who had been mistakenly shipped from the coast 
would be safely returned; Earle reassured Duke that 'I do not Want to wrong Nor 1 
never did wrong any man one Copper'. The personal dimension of this correspondence 
should be noted: ' You know very well 1 Love all Calabar', wrote Earle, observing that 
he himself had three sons and a daughter. In conveying his sympathies and reiterating 
his pledge to correct the injustice, Earle also passed on the greetings of his wife, who 
'Sends you her Love'.64 
Good relations between British and Biafran merchants also were promoted through the 
overseas travels of the Calabar elite. Thus, in 1773, Otto Ephraim of Old Town sent 
a young boy to Liverpool as a companion to Joshua Lace, son of the Liverpool slave 
trader, Ambrose Lace; as was the case with other sons and dependents of the leading 
Calabar merchants, he was probably also to be educated. Ephraim was willing to 
supply slaves to one of the Liverpool ships then at Old Calabar because of Lace's 
620n the patterns of British merchant participation in slaving voyages to Old Calabar 
and neighbouring places, see Behrendt, British Slave Trade, 301-3 . 
63Granovetter, 'Economic Action', 491. 
64Merseyside Maritime Museum Archives, Liverpool, Earle papers, Letter Book of 
William Earle 
1760-1. 
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connection with the ship; the master' told me you have part of his ship' .63 
Promoting good relations was doubtlessly helped by the familiarity of Eftk traders with 
the English language. As observed in the early 1790s, the 'Black Traders of Bonny 
and Calabar' were 'very expert at reckoning and talking the different Languages of 
their own Country and those of the Europeans' . 66 In 1819 it was claimed that 'the 
greater part of the male-natives' at Old Calabar 'can read and write English' .67 The 
leading traders at Old Calabar appear to have been both literate and relatively fluent in 
English or pidgin versions of it as early as the 176Os. The clearest demonstration of 
this is Antera Duke's diary for 1785-8, fragments of which, written in pidgin English, 
have survived. But Antera Duke was not alone among the Eftk in being literate and 
English-speaking. William Earle's letter to Duke Abashy in 1761, discussed earlier, 
was in fact a reply to a written complaint by the Calabar trader. Moreover, in another 
letter, Otto Ephraim asked Ambrose Lace to 'Send me some Writing papers and I 
Bureaus to Buy' .68 Furthermore, accounts were often registered on board European 
ships. Thus in 1792 Thomas Codd lodged provisions and gunpowder for one of lames 
Rogers's ships, the African Queen, with Duke Ephraim, Egbo Young, and Antera Duke 
of Duke Town and had ' taken their receipts ' for the same. 69 Anglo-Eftk relations in 
the late eighteenth century thus appear to have been underpinned by a common 
language and, if Codd's experience was typical, Calabar traders were accustomed to 
the commercial conventions of European merchants . 
63Gomer Williams History of the Liverpool Privateers and Letters of Marque, with an 
Account of the Liverpool Slave Trade (London, 1897),547. 
66Evidence of William lames, in Lambert (ed.), Sessional Papers, vol.69 (1789), 49. 
67G.A. Robertson, Notes on Africa: Particularly those Pans which are situated between 
Cape Verd and the River Congo, (London, 1819),313. 
68Williams, Liverpool Privateers, 542-8 . 
69P.R.O. C 107/6, 11 March 1792, Thomas Codd to lames Rogers & Co. 
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This behaviour suggests that business relations at Old Calabar were in part, at least, 
'mixed up with social ones' , 70 which might appear to confirm the neo-substantivist 
approach of Guyer and others who emphasize 'the proliferation of institutions and 
social memberships' in the expansion of networks as market activity groWS.71 Certainly 
the language of sociability sometimes permeated correspondence between British and 
Eftk merchants, as revealed above. As Antera Duke's diary shows, commercial 
transactions between Eftk traders and ship captains were interwoven with social 
gatherings. Indeed, the diary suggests a pattern for . the 1780s in which captains 
regularly attended dinner parties given by Calabar merchants, including parties on 
Christmas and New Year's day.72 Moreover, they shared in other activities such as 
fishing tripS.73 Discussion of business matters doubtless helped to enliven conversations 
on such occasions, and in this sense these gatherings of masters and traders perhaps 
helped to produce the conspiracies against the public interest that Adam Smith feared , 
except that in this case the victims were not local consumers but those enslaved. Be 
this as it may, slaving transactions - and the credit advances necessary to sustain them -
clearly took place at Old Calabar between agents of radically different cultural 
backgrounds - British and Biafran - who reduced these differences to some extent 
through social interaction but who could not eliminate them. 
The extent to which economic behaviour at Old Calabar was shaped by Anglo-Eftk 
social relations is difficult to measure. There may have been a tendency towards the 
reinforcement of business through social contacts, but Granovetter's suggestion that 
70Granovetter, ' Economic Action', 495-96. 
7lBerry, ' Stable Prices, Unstable Values ', 309-10. 
72' Diary', 41-2, 52, 63 . 
73Ibid, 37. 
20 
' continuing economic relations' may 'become overlaid with social content that carries 
strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism'74 is probably an 
exaggeration. Opportunism - or 'self-interest-seeking with guile'75 - is a central 
behavioral assumption of the new institutional econorilics, especially in relation to 
transactions costs. The attempt of well-developed systems of social relations to curb 
opportunism is an important historical theme, but as the evidence from Old Calabar 
makes clear, opportunism played a continuing role in slaving activities. The persistence 
of opportunism in testing the system of private ordering that developed at Old Calabar 
raises serious questions about the centrality of social relations in governing transactions. 
The ' social embeddedness' of credit and trust at Old Calabar arose not from the social 
space shared by European and Biafra merchants but from the reliance on pawnship, 
which as an institution was itself firmly embedded in the indigenous social structure and 
therefore provided the basis for credit arrangements. 
Evidence of opportunistic behaviour by parties involved in Anglo-Eflk slave trading is 
scare and largely circumstantial. Would it have been necessary to hold pawns as 
commercial hostages if there was not considerable risk of opportunistic profit seeking? 
Despite social interaction, examples of expropriation can be found, and 'panyarring ', 
or arbitrary seizure for debt, was still being practised, even if discouraged, in the late 
eighteenth century. Perhaps the most obvious example of opportunistic behaviour that 
undennined competition in the export slave market is the so-called 'massacre at Old 
Calabar' in 1767.76 The background to this episode is obscure, though the 
consolidation of the Ekpe society from the 1750s probably was a factor in the events 
leading up to 1767. In the early 1760s, Old Town was the leading trading centre on 
74Granovetter, 'Economic Action' , 490. 
1SWilIiamson, Economic Institutions, 65 . 
16For this phrase, see WilIiams, Liverpool Privateers, 529. 
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the Cross River. Frustrated by delays in slave deliveries that arose from conflicts 
among the commercial wards of Old Calabar, British traders conspired with merchants 
from Duke Town to destroy the commercial power of Old Town, and thereby eliminate 
Old Town from the slave trade. Reports published in 1790 suggest that the British 
captains in the River conspired with Duke Town to fake the mediation of the dispute 
between the wards. The conspiracy depended for its success on the belief of ' Old 
Town people' in ' the sincerity of the proposition of the captains to bring about a 
reconciliation' of the differences between them and their rivals. 77 Arguably, therefore, 
the relations that British captains had forged with Old Town merchants before 1767 
were perhaps critical in creating the opportunity to entrap them. On this occasion, the 
outcome of deception was the slaughter by British and Duke Town traders of some 300 
Old Town residents; an immediate supply of slaves in the form of prisoners, including 
two sons of the head of Old Town; and the ascendency of Duke Town over Old 
Calabar's slave trade. With its destruction in 1767, the death of many of its members, 
and the deportation of many others to the Americas as slaves, Old Town ceased to be 
a major factor in the export trade, even as a further source of slaves. The ascendency 
of Duke Town was to persist until the trade 's demise in the 184Os. 
Whether the British expected so many Old Town residents to be slaughtered in 1767 
is unknown. It is possible that, just as they deceived the Old Town merchants, so they 
themselves were misled by their Duke Town allies about the intended consequences of 
the plot. Be this as it may, under the tutelage of Duke Town slaving transactions with 
the British in the lower Cross River appear to have followed a less violent and more 
contractual course. The tendency towards opportunism seems, nevertheless , to have 
remained a continuing feature of Anglo-Efik commercial affairs after 1767, thereby 
undermining trust and at times souring relations. One problem was that, like their Old 
Town predecessors, those who seized control of the trade after 1767 sought whenever 
77Lambert (ed.), Sessional Papers, vol.71 (1790),227-29. 
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conditions were favourable to extract higher duties from European merchants. This 
opportunism, in turn, created uncertainty for British traders. Complaints about 
increases in coomey were especially noticeable in the late 1780s when British trade with 
Old Calabar reached exceptionallevels.78 For their part, ship captains also behaved at 
times in ways that undermined trust. Particularly damaging was their seizure and 
shipment to the Americas of allegedly free persons. Thus, in 1789, Duke Ephraim of 
Duke Town complained to James Rogers and Sir James Laroche of Bristol that two men 
had been seized illegally. Ephraim complained that he had been a 'very good friend' 
to the ship Jupiter, even so, its master had sailed away with two of his canoemen, both 
of whom were 'free men'. Outraged by this, Duke Ephraim threatened to 'make 
Bristol Ship pay for them two' unless they were returned by ' Any other Ship or 
himself.79 Whether the two canoemen were returned or Duke Ephraim carried out his 
threat is unknown, but the fact that those illegally taken worked for Duke Ephraim, 
Duke Town's leading merchant by 1790, is significant. Even when British merchants 
dealt regularly with Duke Ephraim, as Rogers and Laroche evidently did, the behaviour 
of their agents in the field could undermine trust. 
The patchiness of the evidence makes it is difficult to come to firm conclusions about 
connections between social relations and credit provision at late eighteenth-century Old 
Calabar. British traders were plainly anxious to cultivate .good relations with the heads 
of local trading houses . Moreover, there are indications that some masters of ships 
expected to benefit from personal relations with the Efik. But, while there are signs 
that 'social content' may have infiltrated economic relationships in the region, this did 
not produce the ' abstention from opportunism' that one might expect to arise from 
78Adams, Remarks, 143; P.R.O. C 107113 , 11 June 1792, Hammett Forsyth to James 
Rogers . 
79f.R.O. C107/12, 16 October 1789, Duke Epbraim to Rogers & L Roach (Laroche). 
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strong personal or social relations.M) On the contrary, as the events of 1767 
demonstrate, when trust was established, there was no guarantee that some deception 
by one of the parties might undermine the ordering that underlay transactions. The 
ambiguity of social relations may have made it, as Sara Berry has suggested, 
, imperative for people to invest time and money in maintaining them' ,81 but the social 
relations that developed among the parties involved in slaving activities at Old Calabar 
did not prevent malfeasance. In such circumstances, other mechanisms were developed 
to support and protect commercial exchange and, above all, to promote the growth of 
credit that bound British and Biafran traders together in the conduct of trade in the late 
eighteenth century. We now turn our attention to these mechanisms that allowed trade 
across the 'interface', to use Guyer's term to describe the apparent economic instability 
that characterized the meeting point of two distinct cultural zones. 
IV 
As Williamson has observed, there is a distinction between credible commitments and 
credible threats; the former are ' undertaken in support of alliances and to promote 
exchange' and are seen to involve 'reciprocal acts designed to safeguard a 
relationship', while the latter are said 'to appear in the context of conflict and 
rivalry' .82 In the case of credible commitments, most attention has focused on 
bargaining practices, particularly the incentive systems that have evolved to enforce 
promises . Transactions can be guaranteed through the legal system, but, as noted 
earlier, ' private order' arrangements can provide the support for contracts. Among the 
various arrangements that may arise, we have observed tIiat hostage-taking can provide 
8OGranovetter, 'Economic Action', 490. 
8lBerry, 'Stable Prices, Unstable Values', 309. 
82Williamson, ' Credible Commitments', 519. 
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the insurance that transactions will be fulfilled. The important point is that, under such 
arrangements, the law is seen to operate 'in the shadow of indigenous ordering' ,83 with 
contracts assuming a largely self-enforcing character, violation of the terms of an 
agreement by one party precipitating its termination by the other, with the danger of 
retaliation. 
Applying theoretical insights from transactions cost economics to slaving activities in 
Africa poses some problems, not least because the sellers of slaves in Africa were often 
also the lawmakers. Where contract enforcement is concerned, detaching the law from 
private order arrangements can, in such circumstances, prove difficult. Be this as it 
may, it is worth exploring how far the conduct of slave transactions at Old Calabar 
conformed to the hostage and private order models proposed by economists. Our 
fIndings also inform the discussion of cross-cuItural trade, emphasizing in particular the 
role of credit in such activity. 
From an early date, various means of providing collateral for loans were developed 
along the Atlantic coast from Senegambia to Angola. Europeans giving credit to 
African traders required collateral to secure their loans; the use of pawns as commercial 
hostages was such a mechanism of facilitating the extension of credit, as we have seen. 
Moreover, the credit arrangements in the slave export trade were similar to those in 
domestic African economies where pawnship was widespread.M Pawns were used to 
secure credit advances in the export trade of the Gold Coast as early as the seventeenth 
83Marc Galanter, 'Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous 
Law', Journal o/Legal Pluralism, 19 (1981), 23. 
MGareth Austin, 'Indigenous Credit Institutions in West Africa, c.1750-c.1960' in 
Gareth Austin and Kaoru Sugihara (eds.), Local Suppliers o/Credit in the Third World, 
1750-19(f) (London, 1993), 106-8; Toyin Falola and Paul E. Lovejoy (eds .), Pawnship 
in Africa: Debt Bondage in Historical Perspective (Boulder, 1994). 
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century;SS evidence of their use in coastal transactions in other regions before 1750 is 
sparse. Pawning seems, however, to have been fairly widespread during the second 
half of the eighteenth century, though, according to o~e trader, pawns were seldom 
offered at Bonny. 86 Because of the proximity of Bonny to Old Calabar and the 
similarity in the supply mechanism for both ports, this observation should be taken as 
a note of caution in generalizing on the extent to which pawnship was a factor in the 
slave trade other than at Old Calabar. 
Alagoa and Okorobia have speculated that in the eastern Niger delta 'the onset and 
maturity of the overseas slave trade probably provided the initial setting for the 
development of pawnship' .87 We cannot establish the antiquity of the practice of 
pawning individuals as collateral for debts at Old Calabar or its interior, however. The 
earliest known evidence of pawning associated with slave exports from Old Calabar 
relates to 1763 when the master of a Liverpool brig reported getting 'pledges' out of 
the ' Kings Town [i.e. Old Town] DUkes and Tom Henshaws [town]', although he was 
refused ' a son for pledge' by 'Robin John Town' .88 Other glimpses of pawns hip at Old 
Calabar in the 1760s also involve slave transactions,89 and by the early 1770s, if not 
earlier, pawning was widely used to facilitate trade. Thus, John Ashley Hall, a London 
captain who traded at Old Calabar in 1772-3, accepted pawns as collateral. In response 
to a question posed by a Parliamentary Select Committee in 1790, Hall explained that 
the use of pawns was ' the way the trade is carried on' in the Calabar and Del Rey 
SSKea, Settlements. 
86Evidence of James Fraser, in Lambert (ed.), Sessional Papers, 71 (1790) , 16. 
87EJ. Alagoa and A.M . Okorobia, 'Pawnship in Nembe, Niger Delta', in Falola and 
Lovejoy (eds.), Pawnship in Africa, 74. 
88Williams, Liverpool Privateers, 533. 
89Evidence of James Morley, in Lambert (ed.), Sessional Papers, vol. 72 (1790), 156. 
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rivers.90 In June 1785, for example, Abasi Cameroon Backsider and 'one of his boys' 
were held as pawns on the Combesboch. 91 
Evidence of widespread pawning on European ships becomes increasingly plentiful 
from the 1770s, not only for Old Calabar but also for nearby Cameroon and Gabon.92 
According to James Arnold, surgeon on a Bristol brig trading at Bimbia in the 
Cameroons in 1787-8, 
we Intrust the Traders with Goods, with which they go to the Fairs, yet 
we expect that they should leave us something as a Pledge for their 
Return. To satisfy us in this Particular, they leave their Children and 
Relations in our Custody, whom we distinguish by the Name of Pawns. 
As the Traders bring us Slaves, or, in other Words, as they pay their 
Debts, so these are released. But if they are unable to discharge them at 
an appointed Day (which Day is fIxed for the sailing of the Ship), they 
are taken to the West Indies and sold.93 
As this account suggests, slaving transactions at Bimbia in the 1780s bore a close 
resemblance to a hostage-based, self-enforcing contractual arrangement. Shippers 
simply enslaved the pawns by sailing away if suppliers of slaves failed to redeem the 
pawns within an appointed period. Pawns were converted into slaves apparently 
without any resort to external legal authority . There seems little room for doubt, 
therefore, that using pawns as security for goods given on credit had become, with the 
possible and admittedly important exception of Bonny, a standard feature of commerce 
in the Bight of Biafra by the 1770s, and probably dating back at least to the 1750s and 
the introduction of the Ekpe association. 
90Evidence of John Ashley Hall, in Lambert (ed.), Sessional Papers, vo!. 72 (1790), 
227. 
91' Diary', 35 . 
92' Diary', 35, 44, 59; evidence of James Arnold and David Henderson in Lambert 
(ed.), Sessional Papers, vo!.69 (1789), 52-56. 
93Lambert (ed.), Sessional Papers, vo!.69 (1789) , 52. 
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The use of pawnship in the coastal transactions that moved enslaved Africans across 
the Atlantic represented an adaptation by European traders to African customs. Not 
only people were pawned; it appears that gold and other goods were regularly pawned 
at the Gold Coast before 1700.94 Alternate forms of collateral, including productive 
trees, were acceptable forms of collateral in the interior, and European merchants 
continued to accept a variety of pledges throughout the eighteenth century in some 
places. 9oS In the Bight of Biafra, however, there was little else other than people that 
European lenders were prepared to hold as security for loans, with the possible 
exception of Bonny. The adaptation of pawning to the commercial practices of 
European merchants involved in buying slaves demonstrates how institutions that were 
not recognized in the legal tradition of Britain or other European countries could 
become a principal agency of merchant capital. In Europe though not in Africa, 
pawning of people was exceptional, if not illegal. The impact of the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade on Old Calabar, at least, was to promote the use of pawns. While the scale 
of domestic pawnship within pre-colonial West African societies is impossible to 
quantify, commercial pawning at the coast almost certainly rose in tandem with the 
growth of slave exports .96 It is possible, moreover, that overall levels of pawning 
people in the Bight of Biafra expanded substantially from the mid-eighteenth century 
onward. Similar increases in the incidence of pawnship may have occurred in other 
regions associated with the export slave trade. 
The number of pawns deposited by slave suppliers with individual shipmasters was 
doubtless negotiable, but neither the proportion of enslaved Africans shipped to the 
Americas who were originally commercial pawns nor the frequency of such shipments 
are known. In 1773, Grandy King George of Old Town reported that one ship had 
94Kea, Settlements, 238. 
90SSee Papers of James Phipps, P.R.O. C 113/261, letters to and from Commenda, 
Succunde and Dixcove, May-October 1716. 
96See Falola and Lovejoy (eds .), Pawnship in Africa. 
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carried away his pawns, including four of his sons. 97 In April 1788, Richard Rogers, 
master of the Pearl, had 60 pawns as well as 50 slaves on board ship.98 In the same 
year, the Gascoigne was accused of sailing from Old Calabar with 120 ' Pledges' in a 
shipment of 540 individuals.99 
The incarceration of pawns on board ships not only reduced the amount of labour 
available on shore but also raised overheads for Calabar merchants, who appear to have 
been responsible for the subsistence of pawns. At the same time, Bristol and Liverpool 
merchants who dominated the trade wanted obtain slave deliveries as quickly as 
possible. It was in their interests to obtain a high ratio of pawns to slaves, a tendency 
that was in turn balanced by the close ties between British and Calabar merchants that 
could reduce the number of pawns required and perhaps even eliminate the need for 
their use at all.loo Such conflicts of interest meant that the outcome of negotiations over 
pawns is likely to have varied. As pawns were sometimes kin of the Calabar slave 
dealers and were presumably also well fed, it was no doubt anticipated that the number 
deposited on board ship would be rather less than the number of slaves that dealers 
contracted to supply. 
According to Richard Rogers, a sensible target was two pawns to three slaves . He 
claimed that when he could 'Gett my Debts in Such Cytuation' he could give the 
dealers just two days to clear any outstanding debts, and ' Should they not pay in that 
time', he could then ' Borrow their pawns to sell in the West Indies' .101 The idea that 
one might borrow pawns is intriguing since it implies that, even after being shipped 
97Williams, Liverpool PrivaJeers, 543-44. 
98P.R.0 . C 107/12. 
99P.R.O. C 107112, April 1788, Richard Rogers to James Rogers . 
lOoOn family ties between slave dealers and pawns, see the evidence of John Ashley 
Hall, in Lambert (ed.), Sessional Papers, vol.72 (1790), 227. 
10IP.R.0 . CI07/12, 20 July 1788, Richard Rogers to James Rogers. 
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from the coast., they could at least theoretically still be redeemed. Other masters almost 
certainly calculated matters differently from Rogers, but there are indications that he 
was not alone in expecting a ratio of two pawns to three slaves. 102 
The premium on pawns probably reflected, among other things, their healthiness 
relative to slaves and thus their higher chances of surviving the middle passage and 
being sold for a good price in the Americas. As Rogers succinctly put it in July 1788 
(and which we acknowledge in our title), he had 'some fine fellows On bd. the Pearl 
@ Pawns Will Live when Slaves is Apt to Dye' .103 Implicit in Rogers's comments is 
the assumption that the pawns were equivalent to the young adult males who were 
considered the 'prime slaves' of the trans-Atlantic market. 
Although the number and status of people to be pawned was subject to negotiation, 
linking pawnship with credit ensured that the parties to negotiation shared an interest 
in prompt settlement of contracts. As a result, credit arrangements at Old Calabar were 
consistent with 'economizing on transactions costs' . 104 They did not, however, 
guarantee that the parties would keep their promises. Keeping promises was perhaps 
especially problematical for local merchants who were dependent on other parties or 
events outside their control to meet their obligations. Indigenous institutions, of which 
the Ekpe society was the most important, played a major part in policing and enforcing 
contracts. 105 Indeed, Ekpe sometimes ordered EfIk traders to ' settle' disputes with 
I02For instance, James Arnold, in evidence to Parliament in 1790, reported that the 
master of the Bristol ship, Ruby which traded at Bimbia in Cameroons in 1787-8 had 
released 11 slaves and some ivory to three local merchants in order to allow them to 
redeem pawns from another ship, the master of which was threatening to sail away with 
pawns. Arnold reported that the II slaves secured the release of 'Six or Seven' of the 
merchants' pawns (Lambert ed.), Sessional Papers, vol.72 (1790),52. 
IOJP.R.O. C 10711220 July 1788, Richard Rogers to James Rogers. 
I04Williamson, Economic Institutions, 17. 
105Latham, Old Caiabar, 28, 38. 
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exporters or to replace pawns who had absconded from European ships. 106 
The terms of this private ordering also included the possibility that, if slaves were not 
delivered on time, masters of ships would sail away with the pawns that traders had 
lodged with them. In short, there were other sanctions used against traders who 
reneged on promises in addition to the judgements of Ekpe. According to one report, 
pawns were often 'the sons and daughters of traders' and the latter were 'always 
particularly anxious' about their fate and 'seemed much distressed whenever they took 
up an idea that the ship would sail away with the pawns' . 107 Concern over the fate of 
their kin was perllaps compoonded for slave dealers by the possibility that, as we have 
seen, pawns might be passed between ships. We do not know if masters needed 
approval from local traders for such transfers, although in local practice, as far as 
known, such alterations in pawn-creditor arrangements required the approval of close 
kin. There were instances when traders sought to protect pawns from enslavement by 
. blowing ekpe' on ship masters who might be tempted to abscond with them1os; the 
crew of ships were sometimes seized or ' panyarred' to force the return of pawns. 109 
This potential for arbitrary action was always just below the surface. Until they were 
redeemed, British merchants normally regarded pawns as enslavable by sale in the 
Americas . if their friends refuse, or are not able to redeem them' . 110 Ship captains 
were ready to sail with pawns on board, should conditions warrant the risk. 
Commercial pawning, therefore, was apparently governed by a precise time schedule, 
unlike domestic pawnship which could continue indefinitely, even into a subsequent 
106'Diary', 49, 59. 
107Evidence of John Asbley Hall, in Lambert (ed.), Sessional Papers, vo!. 72 (1790), 
227. 
lOS, Diary', 59-60. According to Donald Simmons (ibid, 70), to 'blow Egbo' on 
someone means to suspend all dealings with the person. 
I09Williams, Liverpool PrivaJeers, 543 . 
II°Evidence of James Fraser, in Lambert (ed.), Sessional Papers, vo!. 71 (1790), 15. 
31 
generation, unless other arrangements were made. Often such arrangements, involving 
women, resulted in marriage contracts that recognized the continuation of the debt. 
Sometimes, although the justification of such actions is seldom clear, pawns became 
slaves. III The reduction of commercial hostages being held as pawns to slavery was, 
therefore, not the only situation in which the status between slave and pawn became 
blurred. 
Moreover, pawns and therefore debts were transferable between ships, which further 
blurred the distinction between slaves and pawns but also facilitated coastal 
transactions . In April 1788, when the Pearl had 60 pawns as well as 50 slaves on 
board ship, Rogers observed that ' most of the Pawns [had been] redeem'd from other 
Ships' .112 Whether the level of transfers and thus the commercialization of pawnship 
also were also features of domestic pawnship in the interior remains, however, 
uncertain. 
The possibility that pawns might be confiscated provided perhaps the most powerful 
single inducement to slave dealers to meet their obligations. If Ekpe and pawnship 
arrangements could not assure timely delivery of slaves, then losses could be reduced 
through private action. In this respect, slave trading at Old Calabar in the late 
eighteenth century was governed more by private ordering than by legal centralism. 
A feature of such ordering was the possibility of arbitrary enslavement. While credit 
was fmnly embedded in social relationships, this tendency towards opportunism 
undermined that very embeddedness of the credit mechanisms. 
Slaving activities at Old Calabar constituted an example of what some scholars have 
described as cross-cultural trade. Curtin has argued that commercial diasporas 
revolving around related groups of traders living in dispersed communities were vital 
IIIFalola and Lovejoy (eds.), Pawnship in Africa, 4. 
I12P.R.O. C 107112. 
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to the growth of such trade . III Landa has demonStrated that such 'ethnically 
homogenous trading groups' are able to minimize the risks of trade through a series of 
' insider' arrangements; the conduct of business outside the group introduces risks that 
raise the costs of transactions. Because of social, economic and institutional factors, 
commercial exchange at the ' interface' between European and African merchants had 
to develop mechanisms to facilitate trade. 
Although we do not know precisely when credit became a regular feature of Anglo-
Calabar trade, there is clear evidence that British traders who dominated trade with Old 
Calabar habitually advanced trade goods to Eflk middlemen in the late eighteenth 
century. This practice continued during the palm oil era that followed British abolition 
of slaving in 1807.114 Credit advances undoubtedly helped to expand the scale of slave 
and other exports from the region and probably encouraged the consolidation of control 
of such exports by a small group of leading commercial houses. As a result, credit 
shaped economic relations at the coast as well as between the coast and interior. 
The importance of credit is highlighted by the difficulty of conducting transactions in 
the currencies of the trade. As Guyer has argued, European traders supplied 
commodities that served as currencies in West Africa, but these currencies remained 
almost completely inconvertible and outside the region within which they circulated 
they were not accepted as legal tender. 115 In the case of Old Calabar, the currency in 
use locally was the manilla, a bracelet-shaped piece of brass that was imported by 
British merchants . As with other currency zones within West Africa, mani11as were 
imported but otherwise remained relatively isolated; conversion to European currencies 
I13Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade, 48. 
114Martin Lyon, 'Bristol, West Africa and the 19th Century Palm Oil Trade', Historical 
Research, 64 (1991),363-64; Martin Lyon, 'The West African Palm Oil Trade in the 
Nineteenth Century and the "Crisis of Adaptation''', in Robin Law (ed.), From Slave 
Trade to 'Legitimate' Commerce (Cambridge, 1995),60. 
I15Guyer, ' Currency Interface', 9. 
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was achieved through the credit system based on pawning, with default resulting in 
slavery. According to Guyer, the relative isolation displayed in this currency 
'interface', in turn, deterred European capital from penetrating and shaping the 
economies of pre-colonial West Africa. Our findings suggest the opposite, however. 
Despite the so-called 'currency interface', inflows of British capital were achieved, the 
results of which encouraged the integration of the Cross River region and its hinterland 
into the wider Atlantic economy after 1750, a process that had probably begun earlier 
still. 
Expansion of credit had important implications for Anglo-Efik commercial relations as 
British traders sought protection against non-payment of debt. Building trust with local 
merchant houses perhaps offered some protection against the risk of defaulting on 
loans. But the lodging of pawns with shipmasters seems to have become the principal 
means used as surety for loans at Old Calabar in the late eighteenth century. At one 
level, the evolution of this practice at Old Calabar offers an example of transactions 
costs economizing. However, as pawnship was also a method of securing loans in the 
domestic economy, pawning people as collateral for imported credit represented an 
important adaptation of local institutions in order to promote and facilitate cross-
cultural exchange. Similar adaptations of other indigenous organizations such as Ekpe 
probably occurred. In this respect, slave trading at Old Calabar provides a graphic 
illustration of how, despite cultural and other differences at the 'interface', financial 
and commercial innovations allowed cross-cultural trade to flourish in pre-colonial 
West Africa. Price's observations on the importance of credit in the development of 
the slave systems of the Americas can therefore be extended to Old Calabar, at least. 
Moreover, our study indicates the mechanisms for credit in themselves could enmesh 
European merchants in African institutions. The tentacles of merchant capital appear 
to have been more far reaching than previously thought. 
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